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INTRODUCTION
As the last decade of the twentieth century unfolds, 
the world watches a profound and overwhelming growth of 
democracy. Argentina formally embraced democratic 
government in 1983, becoming the Southern Cone's leader 
towards such progress. After seven years, however, the 
actual realization of democratic consolidation is 
questionable.
Early in the twentieth century Argentina's future 
appeared promising. Near self sufficiency in petroleum, a 
literate dominantly immigrant and hard-working population, a 
broad industrial base, and fertile prairies all seemed to 
ensure the reality of the nation's future wealth. Instead, 
the people of Argentina have been on an economic roller 
coaster ride through many cycles of austerity and recession 
continuing today with hyper-inflation.
Similar to economic volatility, politically Argentina 
fares no better. Since 1950, Argentina has seen eighteen 
presidents govern of which only eight were elected. And of 
those eight, four were deposed by the military. Military 
governments employed repression of their people in order to 
improve the steering of the economy. Between their 
economic and political hardships, the Argentine people 
continue to suffer miserably.
In the past, Argentina resembled nations that today
guarantee political rights and that rarely undergo economic 
crisis. Therefore, in examining the case of Argentina it is 
difficult not to ask, what vent wrong? Argentines are 
diurnally affected by economic and political instability, 
military repression, and widespread corruption. What part 
of the formula is missing for Argentina to provide for its 
citizens as nations similar in compositional make-up have 
for theirs?
Many people blame the historical influence of Spanish 
colonialism along with the stronghold of the Catholic Church 
on society. Such hierarchical organization contributed 
greatly to the acceptance of the authoritarian methods by 
which the government rules and it also discouraged broad 
based democratic participation from taking root.
Prior to the independent era, the Latin American 
colonies had been hierarchically and patriarchally governed 
consistent with Spanish-style rule. During the independent 
era the leaders of Argentina continued such a centrally 
dominated system, never really defining for the people the 
role or function of "the state". Hence, today, each 
individual has his own idea of its function.
In the twentieth century, too, faulty economic plans 
chosen by corrupt leaders who were mainly interested in 
protecting their personal status instead of increasing the 
general well-being of their nation, contributed to 
Argentina's present situation.
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It should also be noted that the effects of the 
international system on Argentina become more relevant as 
the twentieth century progresses. While the Argentine model 
of economic strength and freedom severely falters through 
the years, it is increasingly characterized by its world 
position as a Hdependent”, or "peripheral", nation of the 
developr.ng world, as it is constantly struggling to increase 
its well-being only after it first repays its external debt 
obligations. Argentina remains a victim due to today's 
financial institutions, the impact of the world market, and 
the developed nations' expectations of democracy with their 
imposition of political institutions over those already 
deeply rooted.
Inherent within the examination of the historical and 
cultural, economic, leadership, and international variables 
contributing to today's situation in Argentina, the most 
weighty element responsible for the lack of true democracy 
is the middle classes. It is with them that a 
social-democratic revolution could start, with them that 
democracy in its truest form could be defined, and with them 
that the future possibility of democracy's realization lies.
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CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL HISTORY
Only by fully understanding the historical role and 
organization of the Argentine state, and the nature of 
events that determined today's political, economic, and 
social climate can one begin to grasp the problems involved 
in the democratization of Argentina. Therefore, it is 
important to examine specific eras in contemporary Argentine 
history.
During the twentieth century, one leader especially, 
Juan Peron, affected his society more than any other 
individual. The movement he ignited, Peronism, dominated 
the political, economic, and social life of Argentina under 
his own direction from 1946 to 1955. Since Peronism marked 
a new era in Argentine history, and since it has proven to 
stand out as the most significant era, it is important to 
concentrate in this background section on the rise of 
Peronism and the peronist state. Most of this discussion 
covers the period from 1930 to 1955.
ARGENTINA* PRE-PERON
As is true elsewhere in Latin America, independence 
from Spain did not bring a drastic redistribution of 
economic, social, or political power. In 1853 Argentina's
first constitution provided for a federal government in 
which the central legislature would be strong, while the 
provincial legislatures would retain some power.
With a mighty landed Creole class, Argentina encouraged 
immigration by Europeans. As their wealth depended upon 
increasing agricultural productivity within the primary 
goods export economy, the elite's objective in increasing 
immigration was to enlarge the labor pool so they could 
employ the newcomers as rural workers.
This extended invitation had profound political 
consequences as the new settlers eventually abandoned rural 
labor. While industrialization! had not yet fully 
accelerated to its potential, the prospect of increasing 
socioeconomic rewards encouraged the immigrant and peasant 
to migrate to the cities, especially Buenos Aires. 
Eventually this new trend created a middle class, something 
unknown in traditional Argentine society. As 
industrialization pressed forward, the new middle class 
started demanding more political participation.
Hipolito Yrigoyen (1916-1922, 1928-1930), the first 
Argentine president faced with this political dilemma, 
demonstrated his liberalism by allowing workers to loosely 
organize themselves into labor unions, thus gaining some 
leverage in the political arena. However, when the
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traditional land-owning and politically dominant elite class 
sensed the possibility of a loss of absolute control over 
society, they conspired with the military and succeeded in 
overthrowing the President.
Until 1943 all Argentine leaders after Yrogoyen (Jose 
Uriburu, Agustin Justo, Roberto Ortiz, and Ramon Castillo) 
adopted policies that favored the conservative landowning 
class. For example, these men contributed to North American 
and European imperialism by allowing the exploitation of 
Argentina. Presidents, like Justo, also used military 
repression of organized labor groups to ensure the stability 
of the state and protect the land owners and the increasing 
number of foreign investors (Ciriat 36-40).
FOUNDATIONS OF PERON'S ECONOMY
The Argentine economy, like that of other Latin 
American countries, was characterized by a substantial 
emphasis on its agro-export sector. Because of Argentina's 
dependence on primary commodities for foreign exchange, 
world market conditions could dictate the Argentine 
economy's strength. During the 1930s the only substantial 
industry worthy of mention was that of meat packing. Due 
to the Great Depression, there was not only decreasing world 
demand of Argentine goods, but also unusually low prices for 
such goods. Therefore, the possibilities for success of
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Argentina's economy diminished and grew weaker and less 
secure. Such world conditions resulted in rising 
unemployment rates and economic strife among the lower 
class.
As an Immediate response to the decline of Argentina's 
terms of trade# and its inability to provide consumer goods 
for its citizens# a process of industrialization began in 
the urban centers. This resulted in an alternative growth 
pattern from the past's emphasis on agricultural production. 
After the depression# during World War II# this industrial 
sector boomed. "By 1944 industrial production constituted a 
larger proportion of total production than ranching# the 
production of cereals, and agricultural raw materials 
(Corradis 42).
As Argentina's ability to grow Industrially and to 
become less dependent on imperialist powers became apparent# 
an influential economist# Raul Prebisch# argued for his 
theory of Import Substitution Industrialization (1ST). This 
theory recognized the positive growth of the economy during 
the war years that Argentina had not depended on the import­
ation of U.S. and Great Britain's consumption goods.
Prebisch encouraged the growth of Argentina's industrial 
capacity through such policies as high tariffs on finished 
imported goods and government redistribution of income into 
industrial instead of agricultural investment. This policy
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would provide employment while economic dependence on the 
world would diminish.
Although it seemed for a period that the economy was 
booming, the policy of ISI in effect failed. This failure, 
however, did not become obvious until years later. ISI had 
deteriorated for one major reason: While it discouraged the
import of finished goods, it exacerbated the import of 
capital equipment, steel, metals, and fuel. The phenomenon 
of a country industrially expanding but only in the 
production of finished goods is known as light industrial 
growth. Because the government never attempted to expand 
into heavy industry (capital equipment, metals, fuel), the 
reliance on foreign imports to produce consumer goods 
actually grew. The high cost of production, in turn, 
undermined the competitiveness of Argentine manufacturing in 
the international system. At the same time, Argentina's 
exports could not support its own demand for those "heavy" 
industrial goods. These imports could only be obtained with 
enough foreign exchange. Because Argentina could not 
compete internationally, it could not generate the foreign 
exchange to purchase all it needed.
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THE RISE OF PERON
During the early World War II years, as economic
prosperiby grew among the working class/ this sector 
continued to clamor for increased representation, creating 
political tension between themselves and the conservative 
elite. The masses still tried to organize themselves into 
labor unions and some political parties. By 1943 the desire 
for political participation had become so widespread that 
the masses became belligerent towards the military, 
complained of decadent rulers, and demanded a thorough 
clean-up of fraudulent elections and government in general.
In the meanwhile, the 1943 government gained little 
respect from its own people and scarce recognition abroad.
As Yrigoyen had in the First World War, Presidents Castillo 
and Costas had both kept Argentina from direct involvement 
in World War II. However, an increasing pro-Axis fascist 
sentiment was rising through the ranks of the military.
Many believed that the Axis powers would win. On the other 
hand, after 1943 when it appeared obvious that the Allies 
would triumph, and Argentina still refused to join the 
Allies, the United States was offended by such rejection.
After the military takeover of 1943, the political 
environment changed. Through a secret military pro-fascist 
organization, the GOU (Grupo de Oficiales Unidos), Colonel 
Juan Peron rose as Secretary of Labor and Welfare. Peron 
was aware of the vast cleavages in Argentine society. He 
amassed tremendous popular support as he organized every
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type of labor union thought possible and simultaneously 
obtained the support of a few key military figures. Just 
prior to the elections of 1946 Peron delivered a moving 
speech outside of a university. The crowd begged him to run 
in the upcoming election as President, and he gained even 
more legitimacy.
Not surprisingly, Peron emerged victorious in those 
elections. As history has it, those were the last nonfraud- 
ulent elections in Argentina until 1983. Peron was 
responsible for ending the assault on workers organizations. 
He reversed Argentine labor policies and satisfied the 
demands of the left and center. According to Corradi 
(p. 42), "He organized the unorganized.H His objective was 
to Increase the masses1 welfare, accelerate the country's 
developent, enact labor laws, and increase national unity.
He united socialists, communists, progressives, and new 
industrialists with clerics and sectors of the military.
Even though peronism consisted of a forceful and charismatic 
executive, it was no typical dictatorship, since is resulted 
also from the profound alliance between the government and 
the new urban industrial middle class. According to 
Crassweller (p. 224), Peronism was not fascism, communism, a 
dictatorship nor imperialistic. "It was a combination of 
authoritarian corporatism, populism, and nationalism that 
had Caudillo elements also."
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PERONISM UNDER PERON : PART ONE
In 1946 Argentina was ready for Peron to assume 
leadership of the country. He had risen to power in 
accordance with popular sentiment. He allied himself with 
the key sectors of society to bring them together to 
create unity and to increase the general welfare. Under­
standing the needs of the urban-dwellers for increased 
political participation and a rise in real wages/ he 
promised them both and then played upon his promises. As a 
member of the military/ he also allied with key figures to 
ensure that the military would not interfere with his plans. 
He was careful not to offend the Church either. Finally/ 
with a new viable economic program and through his 
charismatic approach/ Peron rose to power.
During the initial period of Peronism/ he tried to 
maintain control over the economy by transferring the 
economic surplus from the primary export sector to the 
industrial sector. As earnings grew he increased control 
over the system. He then nationalized banks/ railways/ the 
telephone and gas companies/ and Increased the purchase of 
light capital equipment. Again, he too neglected to invest 
in the country's infrastructure and in agricultural reform. 
Wages Increased and so did employment levels. However, the
maintenance of existing industry depended on imports of 
necessary items, like fuel and capital equipment. With 
declining GNP levels in 1948, people began to realize that 
the cost of living was rising more rapidly than wages, 
thereby decreasing the real wage. Argentina's terms of 
trade were declining. Economic decline lead to unrest and 
to strikes. Peron tried to gain control again, this time 
by reorganizing labor and naming it the Peronist Party.
Although many Argentines suffered during the decline in 
growth from 1948 until 1951, their attention was diverted 
for a couple of years due to a personal crisis that most 
Argentines shared with Juan Peron. Eva Peron, considered 
the spiritual leader of the Peronist movement, had 
cultivated much support for her husband. Her political 
talents and her strength tremendously aided Peron in 
attaining high levels of nationalism. Che created the 
avenues to enfranchise women, thus becoming an important 
feminist figure. She founded a charity organization and was 
well recognized for its efforts. In 1950 it was first 
officially reported that she had become ill. For ten months 
after this announcement until her death, she was publicly 
monitored. When she passed away, the entire country mourned 
her death. This tragedy diverted the attention of the 
masses from the economic hardships they were encountering.
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Nevertheless, by 1952 Peron's popularity had waned. 
After Eva*s death he adopted a five year plan to cope with 
rising inflation, decreasing terms of trade and the decline 
of the real wage. He proposed an austerity plan of price 
controls and wage freezes for two years and an annual 
reduction in real wages. Although many suffered under such 
measures, creating opposition, the economy appeared to be 
recovering.
Again in 1953 a few events resulted in the loss of 
Peron's popularity? Peron outlawed opposition parties and 
jailed a few labor leaders, he censured the national 
newspapers, and he collaborated and negotiated with the 
dreaded Standard Oil Corporation for "exploitation" of 
Argentina's oil. This was a direct violation of one of 
Peron's original tenets: anti-imperialism. Alleged
corruption of the government also contributed to lowering 
the morale of the masses.
Relations with the Church until this time in Argentine 
politics had been good. However, by the end of his rule, 
Peron had taken a fourteen year old mistress. Antagonizing 
the Church further, he legalized divorce too. His 
discharging of two Bishops almost resulted in 
excommunication by the Vatican.
As tension grew so did violence, mainly from the right.
Politically motivated military officers realized the 
opportunity for power when a series of terrorist occurrences 
led to chaos on June 5, 1955. The Church took down the 
Argentine flag that day to put up the Vatican's. Masses 
left for the plaza despite Peron's warnings of possible 
bombings there. Admiral Turanzo Calderon ordered air 
strikes over Peron's home in an effort to assassinate him.
On August 31, in an ambiguous letter Peron issued to the 
military, he insinuated resignation of Presidency. On May 
1, 1955, he fled the country and went into exile.
Many blame fatigue, poor planning, and lack of common 
sense for Peron's downfall. In addition to economic and 
personal crisis, Peron alienated his most knowledgeable and 
influential advisors because he was so consumed in his 
personal affairs. Also noteworthy in examining Peron's 
downfall is the toll Evita's death took on him, the poor 
state of the economy, and finally, the alienation of the 
Church.
THE LEGACY OF PERONISM
Whatever the causes for Peron's fiasco In maintaining 
the strong popular support that he had previously 
cultivated, it is important to recognize the significant 
impact that he had on Argentine society. He originally 
paved the road for the masses to express themselves
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politically, thereby allowing some political mobilization of 
society. However, when his economic policies began to fail, 
he represented the active population through methods 
previously used during other political regimes. Eventually 
the newly mobilized masses demanded their political input, 
but did not receive a governmental response as they had when 
Peron first came to office. Therefore, this large, angry, 
mobilized force demonstrated, causing instability until the 
military intervened and essentially ousted Peron from his 
position.
The impact of Peron was profound. He accelerated the 
nature of the changing economy from a country heavily 
dependent upon consumption imports to one that was even more 
detrimentally dependent upon capital imports for its 
industrialization, thus intensifying dependency on the 
despised imperialist powers. He also mobilized the masses 
of Argentina without providing for the proper 
institutionalization of this element of Argentine society. 
Once given some political freedom, they refused to return to 
a repressive style of government.
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
The rise of Peronism in the early forties can be 
explained by the fragile balance of Argentine social forces 
like the military, the wage earners, the industrial classes, 
and the Church. Although he mobilized the lover class,
Peron failed to consolidate his ideas by providing proper 
channels for political participation of the masses. A 
society that lacked deeply rooted democratic political 
institutions made vay for military leadership to emerge.
The legacy of Peronism is reflected in the fierce 
struggle between different sectors in Argentine society.
The newly and fully mobilized populace had relatively 
high expectations for political power and material 
consumption. Although mobilized, they lacked effective 
institutional vehicles to achieve their aspirations.
On the other hand, the military saw the mobilized 
populace as a threat and it sought to control them. 
Eventually when the military intervened and attempted to 
demobilize the masses through repressive policies, such 
actions backfired, as the nation became increasingly 
polarized and much more economically crippled.
The basic features of post-Peron Argentine society, 
from 1955-1982, included a ruling elite and a military class 
tied to foreign interests who tried to return the nation to
trade and dependent growth, the defeated Peronist mass 
divided and forced to organized through an underground 
movement, a formal democratic structure of parties only in 
the upper and middle strata of society, and an economic 
strategy to encourage monetary stabilization by restricting 
wages and promotion of the export sector. Such features 
only served to further frustrate the masses and led to more 
recent political violence. By the early eighties, Argentina 
suffered from such political and economic instability that 
no sector trusted any other. A peaceful future seemed 
impossible.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND MILITARISM
Knowledge of economic development of this era is 
helpful in understanding the reasons for political calamity. 
During this period, interludes of growth were followed by 
declines of similar magnitude. Four types of policies were 
implemented to restore and maintain growth and to curb 
inflations stabilization and devaluation plans, foreign 
Investment by multinationals, and foreign loans. As some of 
these policies resembled some of Peron's, they were enacted 
and then re-enacted in 1959, 1962-63, 1967-69,1973-74, and 
again from 1976-80.
Many criticisms of such policies emerged.
Stabilization policies usually hurt the wage earning masses.
Many times wages were frozen while increasing inflation 
caused a decrease in the real wage rate. Consumption fell 
also. While the object of devaluation was to correct the 
balance of payments deficit through the promotion of exports 
and the discouragement of imports, these policies only 
yielded short term recovery and always prompted an urban 
recession. Recession resulted in a decrease in government 
revenue and therefore a decrease in government spending, 
deepening the contraction in the economy. Such policies led 
to massive strikes.
Originally, during the ISI policy popular during 
Peron's reign, foreign investment was favored as the means 
to achieving industrial growth. Similarly, during the 
post-Peron era, investment by multinationals was seen as the 
means to provide the possibility of passing onto the stage 
of consumer diversified products, cheaper goods due to 
efficiency, and more modern products resulting from the 
access to technology. In many cases, however, the 
multinationals undermined the growth of manufacturing and 
employment. In reality much of industry became "final 
touch", since multinationals retained most of their techno­
logical know-how in their mother country. Many theorists 
agree that multinationals exacerbated social dualism since 
they favored capital intensive forms of production. These 
practices resulted in an increase of unemployment. Also, 
much of the profits were transferred abroad instead of being
reinvested into the Argentine economy# further magnifying 
the balance of payments deficit.
Finally loans, mainly from other governments and from 
the IMF were only provided under the most stringent 
conditions. The IMF called for cuts in government spending 
and decreases in price subsidies and supports for 
agricultural commodities. Such practices to obtain foreign 
loans eventually led to recession and unemployment, as 
strikes became more common-practice causing a decrease in 
production, and leading to recession and unemployment. All 
of these policies to mend the Argentine economy only 
temporarily slowed inflation and never provided a permanent 
solution to restore growth. As the economic policies 
continued to resemble past failed economic policies, the 
situation increasingly folded into a crisis of extreme 
instability. From 1955 to the Falkland Island Crisis of 
1982, sixteen governments held power in Argentina.
HISTORIC-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MILITARISM
Suffering the most from the economic policies enacted 
after Peron's regime were the masses comprising the wage 
earning class. When they endured some hardship, they 
participated in strikes and sit-ins. The government sought 
to control and to decrease the populist movement by banning 
the Peronist political party. However, Peron's work could
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dollars, Argentina was encouraged to borrow. At that time 
loans were considered to be of little risk, as the 
international banks had been recently flooded with OPEC 
revenues.
From 1974-1980 Latin American governments used 
borrowed funds to increase public expenditures, such as 
subsidizing industry, at the expense of Argentina's own 
capital formation. While policy makers could have chosen to 
devote resources to heavy industry, light industry was 
promoted. However, when interest rates rose in 1978, the 
terms of trade between Latin America and developed nations 
decreased. Coupled with international recession, 
difficulty in meeting debt service obligations and 
increasing protectionist policies abroad, the economic 
situation drastically worsened in Argentina by the early 
eighties.
ECONOMICS IN PRACTICE
During the mid 1970s the military government attempted 
to solve Argentina's economic dilemmas. General Jorge 
Videla realized the recurring problem of correcting the 
economy while trying not to alienate the masses. First, he 
made Jose Martinez de Hoz his minister of economics.
Martinez de Hoz attempted a seemingly inconsistent policy 
oft Arti-inflationary measures, monetary and financial 
reform, a return to economic growth, and a redistribution of
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Income to produce greater productivity (Epstien* 996). 
Despite these policies, inflation remained extremely high 
and the income gap widened. The currency, the peso, had 
been overvalued and had caused a current account deficit of 
$3,259 billion by 1980 (Epstein* 998). Real domestic 
interest rates had been negative during the end of the 
seventies reflecting doubts about the viability of the 
exchange rate, and causing capital flight of over $11 
billion. By the early eighties the Argentine banking system 
was on the verge of collapse (Adamson* 734).
In December of 1983, President Alfonsin of the Radical 
Party took over a bleak situation. The last four months 
prior to his presidency had been characterized by inflation 
of over 600 percent. Argentina had finished its fourth year 
of recession. Obligations to pay the foreign debt mounted, 
unemployment and underemployment were on the rise, while net 
international reserves were depleted.
Alfonsin* s plans resembled those of Peron, as he sought 
to minimize the gap created by the uneven distribution of 
income and to attack inflation. He wanted to decrease the 
budget deficit by four percent, to introduce new taxes on 
luxury goods and on inheritance, to stimulate economic 
growth through state intervention, and achieve an exchange 
trade surplus of $3 billion. "His general political,
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social, and economic goals for progress were to represent 
the best defense and safeguard for the continuation of newly 
restored democracy” (Looney: 127).
Therefore, in 1984, he implemented the Austral Plan of 
austerity, which consisted ofc wage and price freezes, a 
fixed exchange rate against the dollar and the creation of a 
new currency (Labrini: 511). The government had hoped that 
the interest paid on Austral bank deposits would be 
sufficiently attractive for a dollar-linked currency to 
absorb privately held dollars and allow monetary expansion. 
Hopefully money supply increases would cease and 
inflationary pressures would decrease as a result. Although 
real wage earners would suffer, the government hoped that it 
would be perceived by the population as being relatively 
fair in terms of the distribution of sacrifice. As expected, 
the progress on inflation was paid for by a deepening of the 
recession already existing when the Austral Plan was 
implemented. "Between the second and third quarters of 
1985, GDP worsened form an already negative -4.6 to -8.2 
percent before recovering to a positive 3.7 percent in the 
final quarter." (Epstein: 1001) Typically, along with 
recession, unemployment increased too.
Considerable erosion in popular income led to greater 
labor militance. The main coalition of labor unions, the
not be undone. He had mobilized the masses/ and there vas 
no turning back. Because the government neglected this 
class' needs, populism remained an Important force in the 
Argentine political environment.
For example, popular unrest became evident through the 
initiation and acceleration of violence. Episodes of mass 
rioting in Cordoba in the late sixties and seventies, from 
several guerrilla populist movements, commonly emerged 
as means of political expression in the 1970s. As a 
response, rightist secret police groups combated the 
"subversive" activity.
During these years, it is important to note how many 
times Argentine history repeats itself. Not only do the 
policies enacted during the three decades of the fifties, 
sixties, and seventies resemble each other, but political 
attitudes and governmental policies reflect some typical 
characteristics of nineteenth century Latin American 
militarism.
Political instability first resulted from the lack of 
legitimacy of Argentine leaders. While most only served as 
military puppets, the incumbents enacted severe economic 
policies, mentioned previously, that caused economic strife 
among the working class. Therefore, popular attitudes 
reflected a mistrust of the government.
Repression became the tool most employed by the leaders
and the military to contain populist movements. Throughout 
Latin American history such measures stemmed from the 
dominant force of militarism in putting down popular 
uprisings. Such action, learned first when the Spanish 
invaded and later controlled the indigenous populations of 
Latin America, was employed in the nineteenth as well as the 
early twentieth centuries. The military in Latin America 
had always assumed an active role in government, usually to 
promote a stable environment for political and economic 
events.
Argentine military leaders have repeatedly outlawed 
populist-based political parties, while still permitting the 
upper class to politically organize itself (Corradi: 376- 
380), Not until factions within the once unified military 
deviated from supporting this policy did the country 
become so destabilized and eventually crumble in the 
eighties.
TRACK RECORD OF ARGENTINE MILITARISM
At first, when Peron fled, the government, led by 
military backed Lonardi, resolved to repress the Peronist 
party, but not its bureaucratic controls over the economy.
He preached "PeroniBm without Peron” (Rock: 334). Lonardi 
recognized Peron's firm grip on the public. Although he 
disagreed with Peron's premises, he knew that his own
legitimacy vould not be established without recognition of 
his predecessor and the promise of the continuation of 
Peron's policies. However, only nine months after entering 
office, the military deposed him and supported Aramburu for 
office.
Aramburu, in contrast to Leonard!, attempted to 
extinguish the still present elements of peronism within 
the structure of the labor unions. He employed author­
itarian control by arresting union leaders, abolishing the 
Peronist constitution of 1949, and outlawing peronism as a 
political party. Like Lonardi, Aramburu was overthrown by 
the military in 1959 due to economic instability.
Also backed by the military, Frondizi attempted to ally 
with populist factions and made promises to control the 
economy. However, he became only but another of the 
military's tools. Economic recovery seemed to prevail over 
the next few years, as industrial development was ac­
celerated. Frondizi, however, could only restrain 
inflation for a short period. When foreign investment 
slowed, due to public demonstrations which created the 
perception of instability, the balance of payments crisis 
emerged. Further foreign investment resembled capital 
Intensive tendencies and once again unemployment soared and 
strikes spread. Argentina suffered from another recession 
from 1962-63. Frondizi only escaped open junta rule then
because of severe divisions witnin the armed forces.
When the military disallowed Frondizi from nomina­
tion in the upcoming elections, another military puppet, 
Arturo Illia, became President. Illia attempted to control 
the economy through identical unpopular methods as in other 
periods, thua causing civil unrest. Unions opposed such 
policies through strikes and sit-ins. Although prohibited 
as a political party, Peronists were becoming more popular. 
In 1966 the army abandoned Illia and Ongania emerged as the 
new leader.
Ongania promised to yield to true democracy after he 
restored the economy, revived growth, and achieved social 
peace. To accomplish such a feat, he first wanted to create 
political stability. He did this through the use of force 
by intervening in the national universities, creating a 
police force, and by not accommodating trade unions. All 
strikes were smothered by the government. In 1967 he tried 
yet a new stabilization plan called the Kreiger Vanesa Plan. 
Like those stabilization plans of 1952, 1959, and 1962, this 
plan relied on a steep devaluation.
The most significant riot Argentina ever experienced 
erupted in 1969 in Cordoba. Ongania lost all authority 
after the repression of students and auto workers. Violence 
broke out in the streets as cars were overturned, shop 
windows were destroyed, and people were trampled upon. It
was evident that Ongania could not restore the social peace 
as he planned. Since the tension in the political 
environment became so great/ foreign investment fled from 
Argentina. Rural guerrilla groups emerged in 1970. 
Simultaneously a secret police group, Mano, appeared. Mano 
participated in the kidnapping of students and union 
militants. Those who returned reported that torture vas the 
main method of information gathering employed by the police 
group.
In 1970 General Roberto M. Levingston took o\er and 
tried another stabilization program. But again in 1971 
Cordoba erupted into its second violent explosive 
demonstration. When he could not maintain power, he 
surrendered the office to Lanusse, who promised elections 
and restoration of civilian government in 1973. However, 
guerrilla movements and clandestine group action of the 
right accelerated. Lanusse lifted the eighteen year ban on 
Peronism to increase his own popularity.
Since Peron kept in touch with certain factions while 
in exile, he could influence and motivate certain sectors of 
Argentine society to support his return. While visiting the 
country in 1972, Peron restored Peronist control over unions 
and business associations. The masses1 expectations rose as 
they hoped for a restoration of security and the possibility 
of economic prosperity. In 1973 a close companion of Peron, 
Campora, won the election. Although a Peronist attained
political power, stability di32fiot occur. Therefore, the 
masses clamored for, "Peronism with Peron."
Once in power again (1972-1974), Peron's presence 
increased the level of optimism, but he could not restore 
order, even among his followers. Still guerrilla groups and 
violence prevailed. Now a new secret police organization on 
the right became active, the Triple A. Peron assumed power 
during a brief period of economic prosperity, and taking 
advantage of a political calm, enacted similar economic 
policies to those of his first two terms. He allowed 
stiffer sentence terms for terrorist acts and ignored the 
Triple A's brutality. But in 1974 at the age of 
seventy-nine, he died of heart failure.
When his widow, Isabel, assumed power, the pressure 
from the economic, political, and social crisis increased. 
Through 1974 more guerrilla warfare, bombings and 
assassinations were carried out and the government finally 
declared a state of siege. From 1974-76, when she was 
removed by a military coup, Isabel Peron enacted economic 
policies similar to her predecessors1.
In 1976 General Videla became the head of a military 
junta, marking the beginning of a period of time that 
would later be known as "the dirty war". General Viola, 
after Videla, continued using the most severe forms of 
repression yet known to the Argentine people. Kidnapping 
and torture were used upon thousands of Argentine citizens
as a method of control by state terrorism*
Consequently, the economic policies of the Minister of 
the Economy, Martinez de Hoz, were merely intensified 
replicas of preceding plans to straighten out the economy. 
Not only did they drastically fail, but they, and other 
factors to be discussed, contributed to a steadily growing 
phenomenon in Argentina -- the emergence of a severely 
poverty-stricken class.
Political divisions within the military allowed General 
Galtieri to rise to presidency in 1982. He, amongst others, 
recognized the decreasing unity within the armed forces and 
its waning control over the population. Therefore he 
attempted to use a new method of control —  creating 
national unity by initiating a war in the Falkland Islands. 
Such an act diverted the country's attention and finally 
demonstrations of solidarity within all sectors of Argentine 
society emerged in support of the war.
SUMMARY
The situation that resulted from an economic policy of 
Increasing industrial growth and stabilization of the 
economy favored the elite classes, while the mobilized 
masses believed such policies counter to their own best 
interests. Resulting from such diverse attitudes was 
extreme political tension. This tension led to protest that
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drev the army in to quell such demonstrations of unrest and 
to demobilize the frustrated populace. As the military 
sought demobilization of the masses, it too disintegrated as 
a cohesive unit. Extreme violence in society emerged from 
both leftist guerrilla groups and from the secret police 
groups on the right as social tensions soared. Due to this 
entangled process, the military never sufficiently resolved 
fundamental problems in Argentina: Industrialization failure 
and proper institutionalization of the masses. The violence 
that erupted throughout the seventies is a direct bi-product 
of such repression. Finally in 1982, the country vas left 
with no other recourse but to plunge into war against 
another nation to avoid its self destruction.
Historically the military has been revered as the one 
institution the Argentine people could rely on in times of 
crisis to bring stability to the forefront. It is the 
logical extension of patriarchal and hierarchical dominance 
first laid down by the Spanish and by the Church in the 
colonial period and continued by the caudillo of the 
independent era. The Argentine people still look to the 
military for confidence as a child looks to his father for 
authority. Such authority is not only accepted, but 
requested each time it seems as though the crisis is at a 
climax. Its function is an integral part of the Argentine 
political culture.
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THE ROOTS OF TODAY’S ECONOMIC CRISIS
Argentina, a nation well endowed with both human and 
natural resources and a vast productive agricultural 
capacity, can be considered a potentially wealthy country. 
However, since its independence, it has never been able to 
sustain its own economic acMvity. Particularly since the 
1940s, the majority of the Argentine population has suffered 
economic crisis upon crisis, causing significant instability 
within the political foundation of the country.
Emerging from deep stagnation and entering onto a path 
of self-sustained economic growth, however seemingly 
impossible for Argentina, is the only way to avoid the 
possibility of widening already existing social and 
political cleavages in the 1990s. Argentina*s economy has 
suffered recurrent crises interrupting this process. Such 
problems that still remain include large trade deficits, 
foreign debt, and high rates of inflation. Many past 
policies have been tried and later retried again by 
different leaders with various political leanings.
FROM PRIMARY EXPORT ECONOMY TOWARDS INDUSTRIALIZATIONi 
ARGENTINA AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION
The roots of Argentina*s present economic crisis were
planted during the first Peronist era, when the Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policy was first 
implemented. Peron plundered the wealth of the agricultural 
sector to pay for the industrialization of Argentina. Since 
the export trade became nationalized, the farmers were 
forced to sell their goods for much less than market price. 
Agricultural producers, with far less incentive than 
previously, have never fully recovered as agricultural 
output has never assumed its role as a world-wide leader 
(Ambrose: 20).
The other detrimental effect ISI had on the Argentine 
economy was that industry could not compete internationally, 
because of the concentration on "light" industry (the 
production of consumer goods) instead of "heavy" industry 
(the production of capital equipment). Due to the 
importation of all capital equipment, production costs were 
high, and prices followed. Industry could only rely on the 
domestic market instead of competing abroad. The imposition 
of extreme tariffs for imported goods allowed the government 
to subsidize industry. Such actions only led to increased 
government spending and caused inefficiencies in production 
to be passed on to the consumer (Country Report: Argentina).
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ISI'S UNEXPECTED SIDE-EFFECTS
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Another problem, a constantly shrinking domestic 
market, emerged as most wage earners suffered tremendously. 
Due to the colossal amount of government spending on 
industrial subsidies, and to the increasing balance of 
payments deficit resulting from events such as the OPEC 
crisis of the seventies, the government employed 
stabilization policies. Argentina's rate of inflation 
mounted as the price of finished products had to increase.
As a result of inflationary pressures along with government 
stabilization policies, the real wage rate declined, 
drastically hurting the populace. As the average wage 
earner could not afford either Argentine produced goods, nor 
imported goods, he suffered and caused the domestic market 
to contract.
CONSTRAINTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Besides the characteristics of the Argentine economy, 
the international conditions of the seventies contributed to 
today's economic crisis. The initiation of floating 
exchange rates in 1971 followed by a decline in the relative 
value of the dollar had a detrimental effect on Argentina. 
Since the dollar facilitated trade between the U.S. and 
other developing nations, and since the oil needed in 
industrialization and consumption had to be purchased with
CGT, called its fourth strike during the Alfonsin 
administration in January of 1986. Talks between the CGT 
and the government proceeded for months as little was 
accomplished.
The increased trouble with labor signified the weakness 
of the Radical party. The unions would only cooperate with 
such a government as long as they received wage increases 
for their members. Increasingly, potential investors in 
business were hesitant to pursue their original objectives. 
Farmers protested what they saw as high taxes by uniting in 
work stoppages. Finally, several Peronist provinces escaped 
spending restrictions by creating their own money and by 
refusing to obey Central bank directives (Epstein:
998-1002).
After its first eighteen months, like previous attempts 
to mend the economic crisis, the Austral Plan failed. 
Suffering from difficulties in enforcement without popular 
support, the Austral Plan helped Alfonsin misallocate 
resources and actually decrease the standard of living. 
Government intervention through price controls, tariffs, 
increased borrowing and inflation only hindered economic 
progress.
After Alfonsin moved elections earlier than planned to 
April of 1989, Peronist leader, Menem, was elected. He
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drastically increased the money supply to lover interest 
rates. He neglected to cut government spending, and 
instead increased taxes. Only one week later the economy 
suffered a total collapse. Presently the situation does not 
seem too hopeful. Investment is at a halt and little 
construction is taking place. "Ford, Fiat, and Peugot are 
working at twenty-four percent capacity of production" 
(Ambrose* 21). Unemployment is exploding to unprecedented 
levels as firms and the government let go of 
unnecessary labor to cut costs.
CONCLUSIONS
Many critics of past Argentine regimes agree that if 
the government would have taken less of a Keynesian, or 
government interference in economic crisis, approach to 
economic policy and more of a hands off approach to 
development, then the country's economic progress could have 
increased. They believe that past governments did not 
know their role with regard to the economy. Such 
profound misunderstanding contributes to only more economic 
and political instability. Most do not believe that the 
shock of hyper-inflation can be stopped without the shock of 
a recession. As in the past, however, a recession would 
send people to the streets in mass demonstration, only 
creating and increasing levels of political instability.
Although an open economy without outrageous protective 
tariffs and the commitment of the government to stop adding 
to the inefficiencies of industry through granting subsidies 
would be necessary to help the Argentine economy, that would 
only scrape the surface of the problem. For Argentina to 
solve its current economic difficulties, the economy would 
have to be stimulated through substantial private 
investment. Only in this case could the educated work force 
be employed. Ar. employed work force would ensure the 
expansion of the domestic market.
However, certain factors are presently discouraging 
such a recovery. For one, with no reforms in income distri­
bution, the lower classes cannot accumulate wealth and 
therefore, cannot help to increase the domestic market. 
Another reason why it is so difficult for growth to occur 
is the political atmosphere of the country. In the past 
Argentina's political instability only dissuaded 
entrepreneurs from investing in that economy. And finally, 
the government has always had to concentrate so intently on 
its economic crises that it cannot increase the quality nor 
the quantity of government services, particularly education, 
or the retraining of labor into another sector once they 
have been fired.
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Whatever the grand design of politicians and economists 
of the past, attempts at mending the economy of Argentina 
vhen an entire overhaul of the system is necessary have 
proven to be significantly costly failures. On the other 
hand, given the economic and political constraints of the 
society, administrators have fev other alternatives vithin 
the democratic framework of government.
THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
To examine the possibilities of, the process of and the 
progresss of democratization in any nation, it is essential 
to examine the forces that contribute to its political, 
social and economic climate, and, most importantly, one must 
explain fundamental properties of democracy* Without a 
working definition of democracy, the detailed description 
of history in Argentina, for example, is meaningless. 
Similarly, in examining the democratization of Argentina, it 
is helpful to explain why countries move towards democracy, 
the conditions necessary to allow for its realization, as 
well as possible obstacles to such a process. Only after 
discussing such general concepts, especially those relative 
to Latin America, can one begin to examine the 
democratization of Argentina.
DEMOCRACYi A DEFINITION
To provide for the efficient administration of society, 
man organizes himself in some logical structure. Through 
milleniums of trial and error, various forms of government 
contributed to the relatively recent evolution of democracy, 
the dominant ideology of the twentieth century. History 
demonstrates that nations are not born democratic, but 
rather achieve democratic qualities after first struggling
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under some other form of government.
Different nations do not share identical histories; 
only the historical and cultural constraints of each nation 
can define its form of government, and therefore, democracy. 
Acknowledging the fact that democracy's parameters are 
individually determined within the context of a nation's 
experiences excludes the possibility that two identical 
democratic states exist.
Democracy implies the sharing of power. More 
specifically, though, many past theorists define democracy 
in traditional institutional terms as a system of checks 
and balances within a governmental framework as well as a 
separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. 
Such definitions further imply the imposition of elections 
in determining officers of the state. Also included are the 
political freedoms like freedom of the press, the right to 
assemble, the right to participate in the political process, 
and the freedom to form opposition. The degree of public 
awareness and the accountability for the collection and 
expenditure of public funds, civilian supremacy over the 
military, the separation of Church and state, the strength 
of the local government, and a representative pluralistic 
government, are all characteristics commonly emphasised when 
discussing democratic governments as well (Wiardat140-141).
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Hovever complete such a definition appears, such a 
myopic view of democracy is a dangerous method by which to 
compare nations1 democratization processes. It is difficult 
to accept such a definition, cor it ignores the realities of 
the histories of other states. It is too caught up in the 
Anglo-American framework of democracy, thus it perceives 
experiences that fall short of the stated requirements as 
failures. Such a view of democracy is many times not only 
ethnocentric, but it serves as an excuse to justify a 
country*s decision to invade another at random. Such a view 
of democracy constrains the ability of some nations to 
develop the true form of POKER-SHARING that would best suit 
their historic experiences. Perceiving democracy in such a 
traditional light can lead to the imposition of 
dysfunctional institutions over an already existing and 
deeply entrenched hierarchical system (Wiardat 146).
Nevertheless, although the traditional definition of 
democracy can be dangerous, it also at times, if kept within 
perspective, can be helpful in examining the operation of 
democratizing countries.
Still, a more modern and less restrictive definition is 
necessary to broaden the scope of and lift democracy from 
the Anglo-American specific context. Democracy can be 
described as a system by which different groups are
guaranteed access to political institutions and where 
conflicting interests are expected. In a democratic state 
all participants are familia.: with the process by which 
conflicts are terminated. Each group has a choice of a 
strategy in resolving a conflict, while each strategy has a 
consequence. Democracy is a constant struggle to pursue 
interests with no guarantee of future outcomes. Such 
outcomes are not uniquely determined by institutional 
arrangements nor by places occupied by the participants 
within the system. Unlikely outcomes can *nd do occur. 
Democracy is the institutionalization of uncertainty. All 
groups are subject to such uncertainty and no group can 
intervene when outcomes of conflicts violate the individual. 
No one's self interests are guaranteed (O'Donnells 60).
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DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY
Since democracy implies the possibility of an 
alternation of power, the transition to democracy refers to 
more than simply a liberalization of an authoritarian 
regime. While liberalization indicates a decline in 
repression and a reestablishment of civil rights, it does 
not include the institutionalization needed to allow for a 
true alternation of power. The transition to democracy, 
therefore, refers to the total reconstruction of already 
existing Institutions into some viable structure that will
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allow for power-sharing.
Various groups who seek to implement democracy share 
the belief that their well-being will increase with such a 
system. Przeworsky explains that groups* interests are at 
stake. Each group has a purpose;
the armed forces want to preserve authority, the 
bourgeoisie wants to preserve the ownership of the 
means of production and the authority to direct 
production, the state apparatus' (police and 
technocrats) survival depends upon the political 
and economic survival of the state. The working 
class organizes itself in pursuit of increasing 
its economic and political well-being. In sum, 
after a violent (and sometimes non-violent) 
struggle, the costs of trying to eliminate the 
force of another group outweighs or exceeds the 
costs of tolerating each other's differences 
(Przeworskii 33).
After a struggle, members of groups within a society finally 
realize that it is more practical to cooperate with the 
other sectors than to continue to battle against them.
The impetus for democratization can also come from 
outside of the system. Some view democracy as desirable 
because it is associated with stable, safe, politically
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free, socially just and economically sound capitalist 
nations. Countries see the establishment of democracy as a 
necessary condition for the eventual realization of such 
goals. Many times such countries are under or have 
histories of authoritarian and/or totalitarian regimes in 
which these freedoms are lees common. In thir case, 
democracy is desirable to increase personal freedoms and 
economic well-being after acknowledging the progress of 
other democratic nations (Whitehead:9).
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT: MILITARY 
Besides the will to democratize, certain conditions 
must be present in a society to allow for such a transition. 
The most obvious barrier to achieving democracy is the 
threat represented by the military apparatus. The 
transition to democracy can only occur due to a breakdown of 
an authoritarian regime. Prior to that time the armed forces 
commonly put down any movement towards democracy, as no 
opposition is permitted. Authoritarian regimes seek 
stability; it is possible that this condition is already met 
prior to the breakdown. Obvious support for alternate 
governments wanes during militarist regimes. Therefore, at 
the time of authoritarian deterioration, it is possible 
that the regime has already realized its functional needs.
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Breakdowns in authoritarian regimes aloo occur due to 
conflicts within the ruling block that cannot be internally 
reconciled. Upon disagreement/ sectors within the military 
often go to external groups for support. Due to its lack of 
cohesiveness/ a divided leadership that cannot continue to 
enforce stability/ inevitably disintegrates (Przeworskit32).
As the gr*p of an authoritirian regime loosens, a 
liberalization followed by the move towards democracy 
accompanies the change. While individuals enjoy their first 
morsels of freedom that the liberalizing regime allows, such 
a taste only whets their appetite for democracy and the full 
range of political freedoms and increased well-being that 
are associated with it.
Another factor that can accelerate authoritarian 
breakdown and eventually help cause a transition to 
democracy is the international climate at the time of the 
breakdown. Sometimes an authoritarian regime may have to 
forgo certain policies due to foreign pressures.
Governments can enter into treaties and aid packages 
favoring liberalizing regimes. Such actions, many times, 
serve to encourage the sectors of society struggling for its 
liberalization, as those who seek liberalization detect a 
weakness in the authoritarian regime's power.
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT! ECONOMY
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When adopting any new political system, one essential 
condition to allow for a smooth transition is a stable 
economy, and specifically, one that will lend itself well to 
the new type of political framework. Attempting to employ 
democracy, such a condition is especially crucial, for in a 
democracy opposition is permitted and should be encouraged. 
Under a democratic system, however, economic difficulties 
lead to popular discontent. Such movements prohibit the 
potential production levels to be realized, thus contribute 
to and further escalate the cyclical economic crisis.
When a nation's economy is unstable, the people are 
usually suffering. Governments have difficulty maintaining 
their legitimacy to operate, so all attempts towards laying 
down the proper institutional framework for democracy fails. 
Thus, often the laws enacted are ineffective and neglected 
by the public. Executive authority is weak as well, for the 
leader is unpopular, and the existence of democracy 
diminishes the role of the powerful military.
With primary survival needs as the stimulus for 
widespread political participation, the populace is 
distracted from the implementation of "democracy" and 
unconcerned about "political institutionalization" • 
Governmental attempts Ci‘ regaining legitimacy by satisfying 
its citizens come from aid packages and foreign loans, which
eventually only dig the economic hole deeper and contribute 
to future economic instability. The push towards the true 
realization of democracy can only start after economic 
crisis is resolved, or the desirability of democracy drops 
to the people*s second instead of their first priority.
POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO THE REALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 
Although the breakdown of and the accompanying 
liberalization of an authoritarian bureaucracy are necessary 
factors to the transition to democracy, they are by no means 
sufficient, for many obstacles still exist. Certain 
historical factors have favored the emergence of democracy 
in some regions more than in others. Organizational 
differences between colonialism in North America and South 
America on political, social, and economic fronts explain 
such distinct developmental experiences. For example, while 
North Americans could practice limited representative 
government, the Hispanic Americans experienced bureaucratic 
and hierarchical organization of political administration.
A religiously Catholic and hegemonic Latin America 
contrasted North American pluralist beliefs of 
individuality. While North America developed an open multi­
class system as the result of early Industrial capitalist 
society, South Americans remained socially closed with 
little mobility due to an economically feudal monopolist and
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mercantilist model (Wiarda: 40-42).
During the independent era hispano-american nations 
further strayed from the possibilities of democracy as the 
struggle for independence never brought social change.
The result of independence was that the king was removed as 
the symbol of political power but the base and intermediate 
levels of the system were unchanged. To accompany 
independence, the elite filled the vacuum created by the 
crown's withdrawal. The continuing legitimacy crisis 
resulted in no agreed upon concept of the state. 
Institutional development was neglected during the 
independent era, as it would have provided for a more 
concrete and widely understood definition of the state's 
function. Therefore, political separation of 
powers never officially occurred. Although Latin American 
nations adopted liberal constitutions, these new codes were 
Inappropriate for those societies. As a result, a truly 
national legal system never developed. Since strong 
ideological roots of the agreed upon concept of the state 
never grew, it became easy for its hierarchical past to 
creep up through the caudillo, or the popular dictatorial 
often violent leader, giving rise to the populism that is 
evident in today's politics (Wiardat 42).
The Inadequate traditional description of democratic
-48-
nations accounts for other historical and cultural 
differences of hispano-american institutional evolution. 
Although human rights are important in Latin American 
society, they are not taken as literally because, in many 
cases, the element of violence that characterizes Latin 
American society still exists. The notion of the state 
providing for "the common good” prevails over the notion of 
the divinity of "individual rights". Regular elections 
exist but they do not necessarily convey legitimacy because 
coups occur and guerrilla groups persist. Opposition has 
always been constrained and subjected to higher priorities, 
and many times viewed as subversive.
Central control stemming from the historical 
authoritarianism is enshrined far more than independent 
executive, legislative, and judicial authorities. Military 
control is expected. Corruption in terms of public 
expenditures is rampant. Especially in Argentina, since the 
Church never officially separated from the state, it became 
the cultural aspect of the state, finally, grass roots 
policies are all together ineffective as so much emphasis 
lies on centralized administration. "Democracy is perceived 
as an idea to strive for rather than a reflection of 
realityf (Wiardatl46).
Other historical obstacles to democracy point back to 
different governmental responses to the mobilization of
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society. The development of capitalism and the industrial 
and educational revolutions, in the early twentieth century, 
brought forces like the industrial bourgeoisie, the urban- 
middle class sectors, and a working class onto the political 
stage for the first time. In different regions elite 
responses varied to such new actors in society. Three 
models of reactions are used! inclusion, or the extension of 
the right to participate; exclusion, or the denial of the 
rignt to participate; and coaptation, which is an 
intermediate form of participation under the control of the 
elite or state apparatus. Coaptation was commonly the Latin 
American form of dealing with popular mobilization 
(Wai8smans 77).
Still other obstacles are more abstract. These 
ideological, political, economic, social, and historic 
references do not lend themselves to well known models of 
democracy. This forces the definition of democracy to 
broaden and allows for new interpretations to emerge. Here 
the gap of uncertainty that lies within democracy widens.
In authoritarian regimes, due to feai of uncertainty, it is 
difficult to establish a compromise among allied forces and 
to provide a safeguard for the defenders of the old regime. 
"Democracy is an ideological defeat for authoritarian 
bureaucrats*. Authoritarian bureaucrats hate uncertainty —  
ideologically, politically, and psychologically" (Drake!
173). But democratic compromise is essential because 
without it a new authoritarian regime is soon to be 
established.
Although authoritarians dread the idea of the actual 
realization of formal democracy, many times they liberalize 
their regimes and label them democratic to increase the 
possibility of becoming accepted into the desired 
post-industrial predominantly democratic international 
arena. In reality, political democracy is identified by 
leftist populist parties more as a mechanism for the 
containment of their followers and for the manipulation of 
their aspirations than as an institutional arrangement. 
Restrictive and fraudulent democracies, and the 
opportunistic recourses by dominant classes to use the title 
of "democracy" wherever it is politically expedient for 
blocking the activation of popular and middle class sectors, 
have not helped the ideological rooting of democracy 
(O'Donnell: 9).
One reason democracy is so popular is because 
authoritarianism is discredited. But leaders are 
excessively cautious in the selection and the manipulation 
of liberal policies due to the eventuality of the military's 
subordination to their plans. Increasingly weak regimes 
form so as not to arouse the military's action. The
-50-
emergence of frail democracy is soon to be succeeded by the 
usual return to authoritarianism because no one will fully 
yield to the uncertainties of democracy.
Political democracy is usually accompanied by a 
capitalist economy. However, the economic crisis that 
democratizing nations face is probably the most crucial 
factor inhibiting their success. Many times governments 
attempts to stimulate growth are followed by inflation and 
an increase in suffering from poverty follows. Opposition 
to governments1 actions demonstrated publicly in the form 
of strikes cripples further the economy by decreasing 
production. The economy remains stagnant, Inflation and 
striking curtails spending and further shrinks the market. 
The economy suffers through a recession. As coming out of 
recession is difficult enough for a stable democratic 
nation, it is seemingly impossible for one in transition. 
Lifting an economy out of such stagnation requires national 
unity, social discipline, the sacrifice of the present 
welfare for the future growth—  which all lead to 
authoritarian control to implement such policies.
Capitalism is inspired by the individual's motivation 
to maximize his self interests. Theoretically, the 
equivalent political prescription consistent with maximizing 
self interests is democracy. However, the market has a
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different impact on various types of societies because each 
nation has its ovn values contributing to its social 
structure. For example, in a generally egalitarian society, 
the market has a less drastic effect on the distribution of 
income than it does in a developing nation. The nature of 
capitalism, in this case, does not lead to democratic 
development but rather to hegemony of the already most 
influential sectors of society.
Democracy here requires the cooperation of ALL sectors 
of society. Such cooperation is an impossibility, for 
democracy may not be the main objective of the people.
While some long for the personal and political benefits that 
democracy would bring, others are more concerned with 
maintaining what they already have, while still others only 
concentrate on daily survival from the jaws of hunger. 
Although democracy leads to the securing of personal 
freedoms, due to its allowance, acceptance, and 
encouragement of opposition, it clearly impedes the process 
of economic development. In this case, self interest 
interferes with national well-being. Opposition brings 
political instability. Given the other cultural and 
historical differences between Argentina and stable 
democratic capitalist countries, Argentine capitalism cannot 
allow for democracy.
Recognizing the effects of the international system is 
also noteworthy. As a favorable international climate can 
encourage the liberalization of an authoritarian regime, an 
unfavorable one can destroy attempts a*. democratization.
Many times the security concerns and economic interests of 
other more powerful democratic nations override the 
democratic goals of their foreign policy. Many examples of 
such a situation are prevalent in studying the long history 
of U.S. intervention in Latin American domestic affairs.
Because the United States fears leftist tendencies, 
right wing dictatorial forces have strong ties with U.S. 
ideological groups. In European democracy the social and 
economic spectrum is much wider. However, Europe in the 
past has had less direct contact with and influence over 
Latin American political regimes due to its location and 
recent consolidation of its own democracies. The many 
intrusions in Latin American politics by the United States 
in contrast to Europe's relative and recent lack of interest 
in the region prove the difference in attitudes. While the 
U.S. can identify better with dictatorial regimes, Europe 
has less to lose with the downfall of a Latin American 
leader (Whitehead:10-19).
It is evident, therefore, that developing nations' 
economic disparities, the long history and psychological
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acceptance of authoritarianism, the existence of a strong 
force like the military, the economic crisis and the 
international system together stand in the way of 
power-sharing that democracy would bring. In democratizing 
today, a nation must not only work within the constraints of 
its national, historical, and cultural experience, but also, 
within the constraints of the ever increasingly important 
international system.
ARGENTINE DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIENCE
After recognizing main historical currents, the causes 
of today's economic crisis, the foundations of militarism, 
and the definition of democracy, one can finally examine 
the recent political and economic events in Argentina and 
evaluate its progress in the transition to democracy.
Near the turn of the century as a result of the 
alterations in the composition of Argentine society, the 
European immigrant brought with him the seeds of change. 
Representing the growing middle class the Radical Civic 
Union (Radical Party) formed in 1890. However, not until 
1916 did the first Radical and charismatic leader, Hipolito 
Yrigoyen, become President. After Yrigoyen was ousted, the 
military ruled for the next thirteen years, aligning with 
the country's conservatives. Differences between the 
oligarchy and the middle class began to fade as both groups 
confronted an important new opponent: The rapidly growing
working class.
Recognizing the workers poor living and working 
conditions due to rapid industrialization and urbanization, 
and also realizing the worker's potential, Peron became the 
masses' defender. Beginning in 1946 he ruled for nine 
years. The government under Peron built hospitals, raised
wages established new industries, and increased nationalism 
as he mobilized the Argentine masses.
However positive some of Peron's policies, th& actual 
contributions towards democracy were questionable. Although 
problems with respect to implementation of government policy 
already existed within Argentine society, Peron only 
exacerbated such conditions by enticing the masses with 
promises of representation and by never fulfilling such 
obligations. Peron also interpreted his executive powers 
more broadly than expected by a traditional •’democratic" 
leader. He used repression when he thought it appropriate* 
intervention in universities, secret police associations, 
implementing censorship, jailing and exiling of political 
enemies. Eventually his industrial policies failed and 
discord among the populace grew. In 1955 Peron lost control 
of the military and resigned from office.
After the overthrow of Peron, the military dismantled 
this political model of direct relationship between the 
leader and the masses. Peron’s personalism produced 
permanent devotion of party channels of political expression 
(Cavarozzit 132). The military banned any opposition, 
thereby making Peronism illegal. Hence, other modes of 
political activity, like unorganized rioting and defiance of 
tax paying, became prevalent. Because of the 
inconsistencies between political blocks and big business
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interests, military control vas rampant. Although it 
always existed, bureaucratic authoritarianism became 
consolidated. Bureaucratic authoritarianism refers to a 
competitive and socially restrictive regime that uses strong 
central force, limited liberalization, and high levels of 
repression in response to the mobilization of society.
Even though Argentina formally embraced democracy adopting a 
constitution that provided for the separation of powers, a 
parliamentary legislature and two main political parties, 
seldom did a government adhere to it. Especially after 
Peron's terms, authoritarian control became the main tool to 
control Argentine society.
Repression and violence continued through the fifties, 
sixties, and seventies, under military rule. However, after 
eighteen years of exile, Peron came back as President from 
1974-1975. Violence in Argentina mounted in the seventies, 
as battles between left-wing and right-wing Peronists 
eventually led to extreme terrorism and bloodshed. Hundreds 
of people were killed in bombings and assassinations. The 
government of Isabel Peron, directly following the death of 
Juan Peron, was the sixth civilian government overthrown by 
the military since 1930. However, the armed forces only 
moved to intervene in public affairs as a result of a broad 
range of popular discontent and urging of such action. "A 
sad fact about the strength of Argentine democracy is that
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the multitudes turned into the streets to cheer the rise and 
fall of every government, military or civilian” (Schumachers 
1075).
Although the military took over in 1976 with the 
intention of ending terrorism and revamping the economy 
through restructuring the party system and ending inflation, 
neither pursuit vas realized. First, the government decided 
to use terror to fight terrorism. Suspected guerrillas, 
psychologists, artists, and journalists all became subject 
to murder, illegal detention, kidnappings, or perjury. 
"Torture with electric prods; beatings, rape and drownings 
were common practice inside jails" (Raniss 30).
Economic policies recommended by Minister of Economics 
Martinez de Hoz contributed to the economic fiasco during 
the military rule of the seventies. Policies designed to 
increase industry's competitiveness cheapened imports.
"Plata dulce", or sweet money, allowed Argentines to flock 
abroad on vacations and to buy imported goods. "People 
remember this period as the time of "Give me six", because 
people would go on shopping sprees to Europe or to the 
United States to purchase six of everything” (Foster! 28). 
Before Videla left office, the economic bubble burst. The 
economy plunged into a major recession.
As a result, Inflation and unemployment exploded. The
peso fell in value, while Argentines with dollar debts 
realized they could not meet payments. As people began 
investing abroad, due to extreme panic, the nation's 
reserves plunged.
Even as the foreign debt crisis emerged, industrialized
v
nations' banks glutted with petrodollars only frustrated the 
problem more with their willingness to lend money to 
Argentina. When the military took over in 1976, the total 
foreign debt was $6.4 billion. By 1982 it had climbed to 
$38 billion (Schumachert 1077).
Another coup in December of 1981 brought Lieutenant 
General Leopoldo Galtieri, commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, to power. By 1982 strikes and protests demanding a 
return to democracy spread throughout the nation. Galtieri 
reacted to the popular discontent by leading the nation into 
an eleven week war against the British over the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands, which had been a subject of 
longstanding territorial dispute between the two nations.
Argentina lost the war. Certainly it was a myopic 
gamble for Galtieri to believe that Argentina could prevail 
over one of the world's greatest military powers. Reasons 
behind engaging Argentina in external conflict obviously 
stem from his realization of the need for an Argentine 
united effort against a common enemy. While the past decade
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had been characterized by civil strife within the nation# a 
common enemy would serve Argentine national self interests 
well.
Other explanations to such involvement may include 
Galtieri's efforts to legitimate the military's authority 
after its popularity had waned in the previous decade. 
Military governments were unable to contain politics within 
the narrow limits of a corporatist framework. The prior 
Peronist government was unable to channel diverse pressures 
and interests in an orderly fashion through parliament nor 
through a social pact# therefore resulted in complete 
paralysis of society.
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THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACYt 1983
Following the Argentine-British conflict# and due to 
the decrease of military influence, free elections were held 
for the first time since 1946. The Radical candidate# Raul 
Alfonsin# won 52 percent of the vote while the Peronist 
candidate only obtained 30 percent (Wyniat 53). Alfonsin's 
goal was to fully restore and consolidate Argentine 
democracy.
Many factors can explain the move toward democracy in 
Argentina. First# a return towards democracy became 
popular. Thousands of Argentines had suffered emotionally 
from loss of family members from the terrorism and
,'counterterrorlsIn, of the seventies. Economically, the 
populace had been hit hard by the foreign debt and the 
recession of the early eighties. They believed that the 
military regimes of the past had been directly responsible 
for all of these undesirable outcomes of the seventies. 
However, until 1982, the military's repressive tactics 
spread fear so deeply that people did not dream of 
protesting against their economic and political disparities.
Another explanation of the turn towards democracy 
resulted directly from the disgrace of the war. The 
Falkland/ Malvina Crisis showed how poorly the military 
could defend Argentina against another force. Confusion 
resulting from uncoordinated efforts between the army the 
air force and the navy contributed to the military debacle.
Finally, the military forced the economy into shambles. 
It was impossible for such an embarrassed entity to 
recuperate in enough time to influence elections taking 
place after such a fiasco.
As a human rights activist himself, Alfonsin upheld the 
struggle for democracy first by investigating the crimes of 
the seventies enacted by the military. Chaired by the 
novelist Ernesto Sabato, the investigating commission took 
testimony from 5792 witnesses over a nine mbnth period 
before submitting its report of 50,000 pages of evidence. 
"The case-by-case elucidation of the military's repression
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of a sizable minority of Argentines became part of people's 
daily diet via detailed news paper accounts. It undermined, 
possibly for all times, the historical stature and moral 
superiority of the Argentine military" (Ranisi 30).
Alfonsin also wanted to bring the country out of 
recession, increase wages, and reduce inflation —  all 
incompatible goals. To accomplish such a feat he imposed 
price controls, and indexed wages above the inflation level. 
However the plan never worked. The rise in labor costs 
reduced industrial profitability, therefore discouraging 
investment; prices rose, the peso fell, and capital flight 
occurred. Confidence in the Radical's solutions fell also.
Economic reforms in 1985, known as the Austral Plan, 
were enacted to introduce a new currency, the Austral, and 
to halt the printing of paper money. Such economic reforms 
attracted greatest support from Industrial sectors and the 
upper-middle class.
This plan became increasingly less popular with the 
trade unions, who supported the Peronists, primarily due to 
wage freezes and a slow down in the economy that resulted in 
job losses and reduced work weeks. Alfonsin was slow to 
restore collective negotiating rights and to normalize 
traditional union bargaining tools. Typical of frustrated 
Argentines, unfulfilled by the promises of the return to 
democracy, they refused to work by striking.
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AND MENEM....
Despite Alfonsin's illustrious final attempt at 
controlling the economy with the Primavera Plan of 1988, 
inflation soared once again, causing a decrease in 
confidence in the Austral. While the popularity of the 
radicals plummeted, big business joined the public sectors 
demanding that the Peronist president-elect, Carlos Saul 
Menem, begin his term iarly.
Menem inherited, Ha bare treasury, huge debts, and a 
virtually collapsed economy. Therefore he knew democracy 
would have to wait" (Wyniat 15). The economic plan would 
try to maximize consumption with fiscal austerity. He 
employed devaluations, increased prices, and froze wageL.
He decreased the size of government, continued to privatize 
industry and planned to stimulate economic growth through 
the expansion of petroleum and natural gas production for 
export.
Whether Menem*s plans serve Argentina depends on two 
factors; The first is the possibility of bringing about 
economic recovery. The second, and crucial to the first, is 
whether he can stay in power long enough to evaluate 
implemented policies.
Two sectors mainly threaten Menem*s career as
President t Organized labor and the military. Although 
Peronists historically were primarily supported by labor, 
Menem's policies are not within the past parameters of 
Peronist politics, but increasingly resemble those of a 
Radical. Menem is altering the constraints under which 
Peronism existed. Therefore, he is not as liked by labor 
as Peron had been nor nearly as popular as expected.
It is odd to see a Peronist government in Argentina 
with so much opposition from what historically has been its 
strongest supporter -- the working class. The explanation 
for his waning popularity in the sector largely responsible 
for his election is logical. Originally, Peronism was born 
to a generation of Argentines to accommodate the obvious 
changes present in the early forties. Peron saw differences 
in the composition of society and formed a movement that 
allowed for historical and cultural limitations while still 
mobilizing the population. He combined populism, 
corporatism, and nationalism as the logical progression from 
hierarchical institutions and government led by charismatic 
and popular caudillos, with his particular situation of a 
dissatisfied and growing working class. He saw new forces 
in his society and elected to offer something to accommodate 
for such change.
Similarly, Menem had inherited a country limited by new 
considerations that never existed earlier. While
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Argent ina is more democratic than ever before, the economic 
crisis is more acute* There are more self-employed in the 
work force than in any prior period (Kora y Aroujoi 183).
The dirty war created an unprecedented gap in the distribu­
tion of income —  one that unfortunately widened during 
Alfonsin's term. Suddenly Argentine cities are lined with 
miles of "villas miserias", or shanty towns, constituted by 
the millions of severely impoverished who continue to 
suffer as each president promises salvation.
The international climate has changed too. During 
Peron's first presidency, multinational corporations and 
large industry did not exist to the magnitude that they 
today. The international financial system has grown and 
become increasingly intricate, more complex than ever 
imagined during the consolidation of Peronism.
Therefore, Menem is acknowledging such a difference.
He is attempting to allow for such new actors and changed 
sectors of Argentine society to Interact within a new 
political formula, or social pact, like Peron had first done 
in the forties.
The other sector with whom Menem must contend is the 
military. Until now the military has not directly 
interfered with Menem'e policies. Recently, however, 
threats from Seineldin and Rico, top military officers, have
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been heard, as the economic crisis and political instability 
resulting from the ever-popular tool of all sectors, the 
strike, increases pressure on the government. These 
militarists have become increasingly popular and welcomed by 
the people as the future providers of economic stability.
1990: ARGENTINA AND DEMOCRACY
After only seven years since military rule in 
Argentina, can it be considerea a democratic nation? It is 
particularly difficult to answer such a question recognizing 
that the present system is in a state of transition. Due 
to the actions the government has recently employed to 
accommodate change, two possible outcomes will determine the 
answer to such a question. First, if Seineldin and company 
step in to control the economy and the population by putting 
a lid on inflation. Such a situation would provide the easy 
answer of "NO" to the existence of democracy in Argentina.
As a governmental force the military's presence denies all 
possibilities to achieve power-sharng, for the military's 
objective would be to maintain a monopoly over society.
Second, the possibility of Menem completing his plan 
and successfully altering the alliance system with regard to 
today's dominant players, is complex and therefore, much 
more difficult to evaluate in terms of democracy.
- 6 6 -
Peron did not create democracy in Argentina. He 
mobilized society and created a framework by which distinct 
sectors of society would align themselves to maximize 
individual goals. His system lasted for forty years. But 
eventually the dominant sectors of society changed and the 
system, as it stood was ineffective — it became out grown. 
Therefore, Menem takes up the task of serving as the "Peron 
of the nineties”, in the respect that he is attempting to 
form a new alliance between today's largest actors.
Like Peron, Menem does not seek democracy either.
Since he is committed to forming only a new alliance between 
the most influential sectors of Argentine society, 
if successful, he will only create a structure so the whole 
nation does not absolutely collapse into a situation long 
overdue —  a civil war. He will create a "new and 
improved" system whereby only those who understand it can 
work within it to reap its benefits by maximizing their own 
personal goals.
Such a system has, in the past not only bred 
inconceivable levels of governmental corruption, but has 
served as the primary reason why Argentines are so 
uncommitted to democracy; democracy breeds uncertainty.For 
the past forty years Argentines have been too concerned with 
economic and political existence in terms of SURVIVAL. The
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Argentine tries to maximize what he has, both economically 
and politically. He is psychologically uncommitted to the 
foundation of democracy as both historical and personal 
experience have forced him to accept and to even embrace 
authority.
The Argentine is playing a zero sum game. If he should 
cooperate and submit to the uncertainties of democracy, will 
his neighbor do the same? Probably not, thereby making him 
worse off. Maximizing self interests are so deeply 
entienched in the Argentine psyche that most people should, 
theoretically, support Menem*s initiative towards a 
redefinition of the social pact —  as long as they learn how 
to maximize their well-being within the confines of the new 
system.
But the most obvious factor in assessing Argentine 
democratization in 1990 is the ease by which the military 
threatens to overthrow today's government. Even if Menem is 
successful, the possibility of military intervention is 
acute and will definitely exist in the future. If this 
happens, Argentine history will be once again destined to 
repeat itself.
Although Alfonsin moved in the right direction in 1983, 
he did not complete the democratization of Argentina. He 
left Argentina to a man who actually serves to defeat all 
that democracy could bring because he allows for the
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continuation of Argentine ills to flourish into the next
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decade.
CONCLUSIONS
Taking into account the limitations of the 
Anglo-American definition of democracy# there are still some 
aspects that can be applied even when noting the Argentine 
historic# economic# and cultural past. For example# a new 
model# one that works within the specific context of 
Argentine national experience# could begin to pave the road 
for power-sharing. It needs its own system of checks to 
safeguard against past tendencies of power concentrated in 
few sectors. Argentines must demand socially responsible 
officers# they must demand that the government's attitude 
toward opposition changes from hostility to friendliness# 
they must not accept such widespread economic immobility# 
and they must demand that the military never becomes as 
strong or influential as it had been in the past.
Government accountability for the public's funds and 
for their own actions would serve as a remedy for the 
people's lack of trust in public officials# for corruption 
would be limited. Corruption would also be dramatically 
decreased if Argentines demanded to be made more aware of 
expenditures of public funds. If the citizens could 
participate in the allocation of such funds# eventually the 
government would have no choice but to uecome more 
efficient•
The state of large scale poverty that exists should not 
be tolerated nor accepted. The Argentine government should 
provide the environment in which it is possible for ALL 
people to maximize their self interests, if so desired. 
Presently rare opportunities for improving their standard of 
living/ let alone for their survival/ exist.
Democracy also Indicates an alternation of power.
But presently opposition is shunned, Even the "democratic" 
governments of Alfonsin and Menem perceived popular protests 
as a threat. Alfonsin claimed that the women who 
participated in the weekly demonstrations against the 
government's dealings with the aftermath of the "Dirty War”/ 
were antinationalist. Similarly/ Menem periodically holds 
that layed-off blue collar workers protesting in front of 
the Casa Rosada (executive house) or even in 30,000 person 
demonstrations are Infiltrated by subversives. In a 
democracy, opposition is to be expected, tolerated, and 
encouraged, not denounced.
And finally, Argentines must not accept the possibility 
of military supremacy over a civilian government. Such a 
condition impedes the very growth of democracy as it 
diametrically opposes the values that lie within the sharing 
of power.
For Argentinians to demand such a new system, one where
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the government is responsible for its actions, one where the 
possibility of economic mobility exists, one that welcomes 
opposition, and one that shuns military dominance, people 
must acknowledge that certain past values contribute to 
today's economic and political situation and they must work 
hard in changing the acceptance of authoritarian rule. Such 
a realization of democracy in Argentina can only be 
possible if certain prerequisites are met. First, Argentina 
needs strong national figures. Such leaders should not play 
the past role of the caudillo by broadly interpreting 
executive power, but they should serve as emotional 
inspiration to restore confidence and the faith that they 
can in fact gain most by working together to create 
democracy. They need confidence and motivation to believe 
that they have within them the tools to accomplish such a 
goal. Only once they are shown the benefits of democracy 
can they begin to commit themselves to the hard work neces­
sary to maintain such a system. Preferably such leaders 
should not originate from the government, as today political 
leaders in Argentina are widely discredited. Possibly, 
someone with whom the people can identify as having 
something in common could lead them down such a road.
Second, the military needs to be considerably weakened 
for such a process to take place. Historically, any threat
-72-
to the military's monopoly of power has served to strengthen 
it and to limit personal freedoms of the people. A serious 
movement towards democracy could only be realized if the 
armed forces do not pose a threat to the movement's 
progress.
Alfonsin had met the above conditions to lay down the 
fundamental characteristics fur democracy to flourish. He 
had been a well-respected human rights spokesperson during 
the years of the "Dirty War", and he had nothing to do with 
the preceding military regime. Also, due to years of the 
"Dirty War" and the final fiasco of the Falkland/
Malvinas Island War, the army was at its lowest nadir in 
history, as it was completely exhausted.
So what did Alfonsin do wrong? How could he have 
possibly failed in finally laying down a system where the 
virtues of power-sharing could be realized? Alfonsin 
denounced opposition and only worked within influential 
sectors to continue running the government instead of 
ardently pushing for progress towards the development of 
firmly root democratic institutions and Instead of weeding 
out corruption and the environment that breeds it.
Alfonsin is not the only one to blame. Although he was 
not as inspirational as was necessary, the major push for 
democratization should have come from the middle classes of 
society. This sector had and still has within it the seeds
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to plant democracy. Only it can allow for democracy's 
cultivation by rejecting anything less.
Taking into account the relative position and strength 
of the military and Menem's lack of effective leadership, 
the only unified popular effort towards democratic 
consolidation would be through a mass revolution. But 
given the survivalist, "if you can't beat 'em join 'em" 
mentality of his people -- especially in times of a reces­
sion, as Argentines now face —  and given the international 
system's dislike and distrust of popular revolutions (which 
as evident in the case of Nicaragua, have been paralyzed) 
such an uprising is highly unlikely.
Perhaps the next time the conditions favoring 
democracy's establishment exist, the people of Argentina 
will act quickly and decisively towards committing their 
fellow citizens to the fruits of democracy —  to finally 
alter the course of their history.
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Table 1. Real wages and factor income distribution in Argentina, 1970-86
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Year
Real wage industrial worker Non-agricultural 
1983 * 100
0) (2)
Wagebill/
non-agricultural
ONP
(%)
1970 113.3 127.6 50.6
1971 119.2 132.6 51.8
1972 111.9 123.5 46.9
1973 118.8 133.5 51.9
1974 132.4 146.8 56.0
1975 134.3 136.2 49.9
1976 94.9 953 36.1
1977 81.2 85.8 34.3
1978 77.0 81.4 38.3
1979 88.9 95.3 39.0
1980 99.0 108.1 45.6
1981 93.0 99.1 39.0
1982 80.6 84.1 31.9
1983 100.0 100.0 39.3
1984 127.1 121.8 ——
1985 111.6 114.0 —
1986 105.2 114.6 —
(1) Deflated by consumer price index of same month. (2) Deflated by consumer price index of next month. 
Calculations on the basis of data of the BCRA; CEPAL (unpublished) .for real wages of industrial workers. Between 
1970 and early 1976 the wage series includes only basic wage rates; since 1976 it includes total remunerations.
Table 2 Distribution of personal income in Argentina, 1961 -85 (in percentages)
Non-agricultural OB A1 OBA2 OBA*
Argentina1 1969-70 1975 1985
1961
Popu­
lation3
Income4 Popu­
lation3
Income4 Popu­
lation3
Income4 Popu­
lation3
Income4
Lower
20.0 7.6 19.3 5.9 20.0 6.4 20.0 59.
40.0 18.2 43.6 19.7 40.0 17.5 40.0 15.2
50.0 — 53.6 27.3 50.0 24.9 50.0 21.6
60.0 31.4 62.7 35.4 60.0 33.8 60.0 29.3
Intermediate
20.0 18.0 19.1 22.4 20.0 22.8 20.0 21.2
Top
20.0 50.5 18.0 42.3 20.0 43.4 20.0 49.4
10.0 38.2 9.4 28.1 10.0 27.7 10.0 33.5
Gini .41 .38 36 .42
1 Refen to household incomes. 2 Refers to individual incomes. See Altimir (1986) for estimates of distribution of
household incomes in the OBA between 1974 and 1981, and for estimates of individual income distribution in Murban 
areas’* (OBA plus ten cities) in 1975 and 1980. The trends are similar to the above for 1975-85. 3 Refers to percentages 
of population. The lower cumulative 20 to 60 per cent; the intermediate (nan-cumulative) 20 per cent; and the top 10 
and 20 per cent. 4 Refers to percentages of income.
Source: Figueroa and Weisskoff (1980) for non-agriculture! Argentina; INDBC (n.d.) for OBA (Oreater Buenos Aires) 
in 1969-70; Altimk (1986) for OBA in 1975; and own calculations on the basis of data of the Encuesta Permanante de
Hogares (unpublished) for OBA in 1985 (October)
Libor Mid Srairty* Page 86
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TABLE 3
ARGENTINA OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE, 
1979*1980
Sector 1970 1980
Middle classes 40 40
Self-employment, 
middle and lower 20 30
Industrial 
working class 25 15
Other lower class 15 15
100% 100%
Source: estimates based on census 
Elections in Argentina, page 183
Table 4. Unemployment and real industrial wages, 1970*83
Unemployment0 Real wage indices
(Greater Buenos Aires) A B C*
1970 4.8% 100.0
1971 5.7 105.2
1972 7.4 98.2
1973 6.1 104.8
1974 4.2 116.6
1975 2.4 117.7
1976 4.8 75.7 100.0
1977 3.4 653 98.6
1978 3.9 60.8 97.1
1979 2.0 68.4 111.1
1980 2.3 76.1 123.6 83.3
1981 4.0 111.1 77.5
1982 5.7 993 73.3
1983 5.2 128.4 93.4
1984 4.0 112.4
1985 5.6 84.8*
Sources: Unemployment, 1970-84 from SIGEP (1984X p 38; 1985 for FIEL (1986), p. 
29; Real wages AAB  from SIGEP (1984), p. 33; Real Wages C from FIEL (1986), p. 
98.
•  As of April t  December 1983 * 100.0 • Through November 1985 only.
Mftttld PfiYtiBgDflft P»ge 1002
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